Santa Clara University

Scholar Commons
Educational Leadership

School of Education & Counseling Psychology

1995

Mental representations of trait categoriesand their influences on
person perception
William Fleeson
Sabrina Zirkel
Santa Clara University, szirkel@scu.edu

Edward E. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/ela
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Fleeson, W., Zirkel, S., & Smith, E. E. (1995). Mental representations of trait categories and their influences
on person perception. Social Cognition, 13, 365-397. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1995.13.4.365

Copyright © 1995 Guilford Press. Reprinted with permission of The Guilford Press.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Education & Counseling Psychology at
Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Educational Leadership by an authorized administrator of
Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.

Social

Cognition,

Vol. 13, No. 4, 1995, pp. 365-397

MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF TRAIT

CATEGORIES AND THEIR INFLUENCES ON
PERSON PERCEPTION
WILLIAM FLEESON
Max Planck

Institute, Berlin, Germany

SABRINAZIRKEL

Saybrook Institute,

San Francisco, California

EDWARD E. SMITH

University of Michigan

at Ann

Arbor

Three studies

explored mental representations of the organization of acts into traits,
Specifically,
membership
(prototypicality), what determines an act's prototypicality, and whether acts'
prototypicalities influence conclusions about observed acts. By drawing on re
search on prototypicality-based models of mental representations (Osherson,
Smith, Wilkie, L6pez, & Shafir, 1990), five hypotheses were proposed about the
nature of mental representations of traits and how they influence person percep
tion. In Study 1, subjects rated three aspects of several acts: how prototypical of
the trait they are, how similar they are to other acts in the trait, and how extreme
they are. Subjects showed substantial agreement on all three ratings. Additionally,
an act's similarity to other acts in the trait was predictive of how prototypical the
act was, but the act's extremity was a stronger predictor of its prototypicality. Study
2 investigated how the prototypicality of an actor's observed acts influences person
and how such mental representations influence person perception.
we investigated whether acts vary in their degree of trait-category
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perception. Subjects
the

acts were

were more

prototypical

willing

similar

or

to

to

describe

an

actor's acts with

a

trait when

each other than when the acts

were not

prototypical or not similar to each other. Study 3 investigated the prototypicality
of predicted acts. Results showed that predictions of acts were not influenced by
the prototypicality of the predicted acts. Together, the three studies suggest that
mental representations of traits are consensual and that they influence person
perception.

great deal of research has explored how individuals use trait terms on
(for reviews, see Higgins & Bargh,
1987; Jones, 1990; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Much less of this research has

A

the basis of observing others' behavior

investigated

how mental

representations

of act-trait relations influence

of trait terms, despite the fact that person-perception processes
almost certainly draw on perceivers' stored knowledge about traits and
such

uses

is, in order for perceivers to be able to apply trait terms on the
observing behavior, perceivers must have some idea of what a

acts. That

basis of

trait is and how individual acts relate to

a

trait.

One way perceivers might represent traits is as hierarchically struc
tured categories, with acts as low-level (subordinate) categories, and
as
higher level (superordinate) categories (Barsalou, 1985;
Borkenau, 1990; Buss & Craik, 1983; Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Read,
Jones, & Miller, 1990). For example, aloofness might be a category of
act-categories like "standing apart from others at a party," and "pre
tending not to see a friend on the street." Furthermore, a trait category

traits

might not be a simple, unorganized list of act-categories, but rather have
an

internal structure,

so

that acts within

of

a

trait

category differ

in their

to the

degree
category. For example, "offering a
"belongingness"
to
a
conversational
overture" might be stored as
monosyllabic response
a

better

example

of aloofness than is

book," although both

"sitting

at

home and

reading

a

could be called aloof. If so, then person
be influenced by this structure, for example, by the
acts

perception might
degree of belongingness

of observed acts to a given trait category
1985;
Borkenau, 1990; Buss & Craik, 1983; Read et al., 1990).
(Barsalou,
In other words, traits are more than just the end products of impres

sions, but

are

knowledge

structures that influence the

impression-for

mation process itself. The point of the present research is two-fold: (i)
describe the internal structure of trait categories; and (ii) determine

whether and how the internal structure influences person perception.
Research on mental representations of natural objects (e.g., birds and

mammals) has produced
tal

as a

solid

understanding

of the structure of

men

draw analogies to this
objects.
source of predictions about
categories of traits. In addition

representations

research

a

of such natural

We

can
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lay theory

of traits, such

an

approach might

describe

person perception (Borkenau, 1990; Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982; Jones, 1993; Read et al.,
new

on

Trope & Higgins, 1993). In this introduction, we (i) describe five
principles that characterize mental representations of natural objects,
and their influences on reasoning about natural objects, (ii) analogize five
hypotheses for the trait domain, and (iii) describe some possible chal
lenges to those hypotheses. The research we report examines to what
extent these analogized hypotheses hold, and in the process helps clarify
both person-perception processes and the lay theory of traits.
1990;

FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND

NATURAL-OBJECT CATEGORIES

Starting with the premise that people mentally organize natural objects
into categories, much progress has been made in describing the proper
ties of this organization and its influences on inferential reasoning
(Medin, 1989; Shipley, 1993). We have selected five principles that we
believe cover several of the major findings of the existing research (based
on Osherson et al., 1990), and that result in interesting predictions for
person perception. This research could be described with alternative
organizations, and we do not intend this particular organization as a
comprehensive review.
The domain that this research covers is natural objects that are organ
ized into hierarchical categories. Natural objects are psychologically
simple categories like birds, mammals, and furniture, and hierarchies
are defined
by asymmetrical class inclusion. That is, categories can be
seen as distributed across levels; lower-level (subordinate) categories are
included within higher-level (superordinate) categories, but do not ex
haust the superordinate categories. This condition is expressed by the
a lower-level category can be said to be "a kind of" its superor
dinate category, but the superordinate category is not "a kind of" the
subordinate category. For example, "sparrows" are a kind of "bird", but
"birds" are not a kind of "sparrow". Thus, "sparrows" is a subordinate

fact that

category of the superordinate "bird" category. The following principles

apply

to

such hierarchical

The first

gories into
the insight

categories

of natural

objects.

organization of subordinate cate
principles
An
impetus for this research was
superordinate categories.
describe the

two

to

eschew the classic notion of

categories

as

defined

by

in which subordinates either belong or
necessary and sufficient features,
a
to
do not belong
given superordinate. Rosch and Mervis (1975) estab
lished the
principle, that category membership is a matter of degree. For

first

example, both sparrows

and ostriches

are

birds, although

most of

us
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would agree that sparrows
triches. To demonstrate that

better examples of birds than are os
people mentally represent categories with
such a graded membership, or "prototypicality" structure, a number of
experiments have shown that individuals agree in the prototypicality of
a wide
variety of subordinates (e.g., Smith & Medin, 1981; cf. Margolis,
are

1994).
What determines a subordinate's prototypicality for its superordinate
category? Researchers theorized that feature-sharing organizes categories.
Categories vary in their features (e.g., Robins are (i) small, (ii) red, (iii)
winged, etc.), and the more features a category shares with other categories
in the superordinate category, the more prototypical the category is of that
superordinate. When subjects rate the similarity of all pairings of subordi
nate categories belonging to the same superordinate category, the second
principle emerges: a subordinate's average pairzvise similarity (APS), across all
pairings, strongly predicts its prototypicality rating (Rosch, 1978; Smith &
Medin, 1981). Sparrows are prototypical birds because they share many
features with many other birds. This emphasis on variation in features and
in feature-sharing was central to subsequent investigations.
Subsequent research has shown that inferential reasoning about natu
ral-object categories is grounded in the structure of the mental repre
sentations (Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975). Osherson and colleagues
focused on two kinds of argument that involve hierarchical categories.
The first kind of argument is known as "general", in which subjects are
told that some subordinate categories were observed to be described by
a certain
predicate, and then are asked to indicate their confidence in
concluding that the superordinate category is also described by the
predicate. For example:
A.

Observed:

Sparrows

Conclusion:

Birds have sesamoid bones.

have sesamoid bones.

Here, sparrows is the subordinate category, birds is the superordinate
category, and "have sesamoid bones" is the predicate. Importantly, such
arguments are inductive, not deductive, because the conclusion is never
guaranteed. Rather, such conclusions are accepted with more or less
confidence, and the degree of confidence a particular argument inspires
is known

as

its

strong, knowing

Whereas Argument (A) may be relatively
that ostriches have sesamoid bones does not provide

strength.

much confidence in the conclusion that birds have sesamoid bones (and
neither argument is perfectly strong). The next two principles concern
how category-structural properties of the observed category affect argu
ment

strength.
principle

The third

is that the

prototypicality of

the observed

category
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increases argument

strength (Osherson et al., 1990). Subjects are more
generalize to a superordinate category (e.g., birds) if the
category observed to be described by the predicate is prototypical of the
superordinate category (e.g., sparrows) than if it is not prototypical (e.g.,
ostriches). That is, if the observed subordinate is representative of the
superordinate, it seems plausible that the predicate applies to the su
perordinate as well.
What happens where more than one subordinate category is described
by the predicate?

willing

to

Observed:

B.

Robins have sesamoid bones.

Bluejays
C.

have sesamoid bones.

Conclusion:

Birds have sesamoid bones.

Observed:

Hawks have sesamoid bones.

Sparrows
Conclusion:

Just

as

in the

case

of

a

have sesamoid bones.

Birds have sesamoid bones.

single

observed

subordinate, the crucial issue is

of the set of observed subordinates. Because the

the

representativeness
representativeness of the

set increases

each of the individual observed

with the

representativeness

of

the average

categories,
prototypicality
categories remains effective in argument strength. How
ever, the representativeness of the set also increases with the dissimilar
ity among the observed categories. Holding prototypicality constant, the
more the
categories in the observed set are dissimilar to each other, the
more of the other categories in the superordinate to which they will be
similar, so the more the observed categories will represent the other
categories in the superordinate. Example (C) is strong because more
of the observed

birds

are

robins

or

similar to either hawks or sparrows than are similar to either
bluejays. Thus, the fourth principle is that, other things being equal,
increases with

dissimilarity among the observed categories.
Note that the fourth principle is essentially an extension of the third
principle, under the assumption that prototypicality (repre
sentativeness) is determined by similarity.
In the second kind of argument ("specific"), the conclusion concerns
other subordinate categories rather than a superordinate category. For
example:
argument strength

1. A

more

precise statement

maximums of the
across
are

is that

similarity of each

argument strength is a function of the average of the
unobserved instance to each of the observed instances,

all unobserved instances. However, dissimilarity and the above maximum function
to allow conflation for expository purposes.

close

enough
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D.

E.

at

the

Eagles

Conclusion:

Robins have sesamoid bones.

have sesamoid bones.
have sesamoid bones.

Observed:

Eagles

Conclusion:

Pelicans have sesamoid bones.

arguments, both the observed and the conclusion categories

In such
are

Observed:

same

level and

is concluded that the

are

same

included in the

predicate

same

superordinate,

and it

that describes the observed cate

gory describes the conclusion category. Principle 3 still applies: the more
representative the observed category of the common superordinate

category, the greater the confidence

in the conclusion. One

might expect

prototypicality of the conclusion category would also influence
argument strength: more representative categories would seem more
that the

predicates of other categories in the same superordinate.
However, Rips (1975) was surprised to discover the fifth principle, that
argument strength is not affected by the prototypicality of the conclusion

likely

to take

on

inference, the inference
superordinate equally. Examples (D) and

category. If the observed category
covers

all subordinates in the

warrants

an

(E) have similar inferential strength, even though robins are more pro
totypical than pelicans. In other words, despite the fact that the proto
typicality of an observed category greatly affects inferences, such

apply equally well to conclusion categories of all levels of
prototypicality, provided they are included in the same superordinate
(Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975).
inferences

FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND TRAIT CATEGORIES
Buss and Craik

(1983; 1984) merged family-resemblance theories of

categories
summary-labels theories of traits to propose a new
to
approach personality: the act-frequency approach. One common defi
nition of traits is as "summary labels" (e.g., Alston, 1975; Borkenau &
Muller, 1992; Buss & Craik, 1983; Hampshire, 1953; John, 1990; Newman
& Uleman, 1993). There are two key aspects of such a definition. First,
trait terms are organized in hierarchies. At the higher levels are catego
ries like "interpersonal traits", next lower levels would include broad
traits like "extraversion" or "neuroticism", one level down is composed
of narrower traits (e.g., under "extraversion" might be "talkative", "ac
tive", "dominant", etc.), still lower would be act categories (e.g., "starting
a conversation with a stranger"), and at the
very bottom would be
acts (Buss & Craik, 1983; Eysenck, 1947; Hampson, John, &
specific
Goldberg, 1986; John, Hampson, & Goldberg, 1991; McCrae & John, 1992;
Wiggins, 1979). Note that people do not appear in this hierarchy; only
with

behaviors and traits appear

(cf., Anderson

&

Sedikides, 1991; Bassili,
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1989; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Sedikides & Anderson, 1994). However, the
second

aspect of the summary-labels definition of traits is that these
useful for

describing people's behavior at various levels
higher the level the category, the more abstract the
description, but the description is of the person's behavior. For example,
behavior can be described at the act-category level (e.g., "slamming the
door upon leaving the room is what he did") or more abstractly at the
trait level (e.g., "acting quarrelsome is what he did"). That is, traits are
labels for summarizing a person's behavior: saying someone has a trait
is nothing more than saying that a good general description of the
person's behavior is that trait term (Alston, 1975; Buss & Craik, 1983;
Hampshire, 1953; John, 1990; Newman & Uleman, 1993).
Adding the notion of family-resemblance to summary-labels models
of traits, Buss and Craik (1983) suggested that some act-categories are
better examples of their superordinate trait than are other act-categories.
As a test of this claim, they had subjects rate the prototypicality (how
good of an example of the trait the act is) of several acts, and found strong
agreement in subjects' ratings, suggesting that it was a meaningful task.
Borkenau (1990) replicated this finding, and Hampson (1982) provided

categories

are

of abstraction. The

additional evidence.

However, unlike for

natural-object categories,

we

do not know

yet (i)

prototypicality of an act category; or (ii) whether
and how the prototypicality structure influences person perception. The
five principles described above provide a good starting point for exam
what determines the

these two issues, and the Osherson and

colleagues (1990) model is
theory that applies to hierarchical categories that
have a prototypicality structure. Most importantly, when analogies are
drawn from the five principles described above, five hypotheses emerge
that are interesting in their own right and that extend the Buss and Craik
model. The left column of Table 1 reviews the five principles described
ining

a

detailed and elaborate

above. The middle column,

as

will be described

below, describes analo

gies of these five principles into five hypotheses for the trait domain. The
rightmost column, also as to be described, summarizes some possible
objections to the five hypotheses.
The first hypothesis states that membership in a category is a matter
of degree. This hypothesis has received empirical support (Borkenau,
1990; Buss & Craik, 1983; Hampson, 1982), and our goal is to replicate
this finding.
Hypothesis 2 concerns the determinants of an act's prototypicality for
its

superordinate trait category.

In the hierarchical structure of natural-

subordinate category is considered a good and
representative member of its superordinate category (i.e., is highly
to the extent that it is similar to other subordinate catego-

object categories,

prototypical)

a
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TABLE 1.

of Five

Summary

Domain to Describe Mental

Their Influences

on

Person

Principle Describing
Natural Object
Representations
1.

Degree

in

a

of

Analogous Hypotheses
in Trait Domain

membership

category is

Hypotheses Analogized from the Natural-Object
Representations of Trait Categories and
Perception

a

continuous variable

1. An act's degree of
membership in a trait

category

is

a

Challenges to
Hypotheses
None

continuous

variable
2.

represent ideals,

Category
prototypicality is
determined by the
category's average
similarity to other
categories in the same
superordinate

2. Act

acts in that trait

extremity

3.

3.

Only

prototypicality

determined

average

Argument strength

by

similarity

increases with

prototypicality of the
categories

prototypicality

observed

observed acts

4.

4.

Argument strength
the

5.

Argument strength
by the
prototypicality of the
unaffected

conclusion category

same

act

be

so

prototypicality might
determined by its

if trait is

explicitly

of the

Argument strength

dissimilarity

Traits

mentioned in argument

increases with

dissimilarity among
observed categories

ries in the

to other

Argument strength

increases with

increases with

is

the act's

Dissimilarity not relevant
to ideal approximation

among the

observed acts
is

5. Likelihood of

If traits

conclusion acts is

perceivers may predict
acts only of a certain level
of prototypicality

unaffected

by their
prototypicality

superordinate.

The

analogy

are

dimensional,

would be that

an

act

category (e.g., "slammed the door when he left the room") is a good and
representative member of its superordinate trait category (i.e., is highly

prototypical) to the extent that it is similar to other behaviors in the same
trait. This hypothesis has been challenged, however, on distinctions
among types of categories. Barsalou (1985) suggested that the purpose
of some categories, rather than simply collecting similar subordinates,
is to organize and rank means to accomplish a goal. For example,
"winter clothes" is not simply a collection of similar textiles, but rather
a set of subordinates that are each means to
keep one warm. Thus, the
relevant dimension for determining a subordinate's prototypicality
(e.g., how good an example the subordinate is of "winter clothes"),
might be how well the subordinate facilitates the goal. In other words,
the subordinate's approximation to ideal facilitation, or its extremity, not
its similarity to other subordinates. Borkenau (1990) suggested that
traits

are

such

categories,

because the purpose of trait terms is often to
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indicate whether other

people

are

for

good

facilitating

certain

(Buss, 1991; John, 1990). He found that ratings of acts' extremity

highly predictive

of

goals
were

of the acts'

ratings
prototypicality, providing sup
act prototypicality is reflective not of similarity,
but of approximation to an ideal (see also Read et al., 1990). However,
neither Borkenau (1990) nor Read et al. obtained direct pairwise ratings
of acts' similarity to each other, so extremity has not been pitted against
the direct measure of similarity used in natural-object research (e.g.,
Rosch, 1978). In the present research, we obtained direct pairwise
ratings of act similarity.
Hypothesis 3 begins our concern with the influence of trait categories
on
person perception. Our basic assumption is that the mental organiza
tion of trait categories ought to influence perceptions of others. That is,
the way people represent behavior-trait relations ought to influence how
they interpret others' behaviors in terms of traits. However, there is little
theoretical work on how this might occur, in part because there is little
work on the organization of acts into traits. We generated hypotheses by
drawing analogies to Osherson et al. (1990; see also Rips, 1975). These
analogized hypotheses, not the Osherson et al. model, are tested in this
port for the idea that

report.
This report
when

of

a

perceivers

set

of

an

two kinds of

concerns
use a

trait term

person perception. The first kind is
abstract but compact description

as an

actor's observed behaviors

(Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Park,

1989; Park, DeKay,
1994). These are the cases in which
acts an actor has done, and go to
number
of
a
small
ers observe
& Kraus,

(trait) level

in the trait

what the actor did. For

F.

Observed:

hierarchy
example:

for

more-or-less

a

perceiv
higher
apt description of

Slammed the door when he left the

a

room

is what he did.

Accused them of

talking

about him behind

his back is what he did.

Argued

over

presidential

candidates is

what he did.

Conclusion:
The

predicate

Acting quarrelsome

"is what he did"

the

means

done

that

is what he did.

(i) something

was

done

(an

by the indicated actor, and (iii)
category. Note the similarity to

something
acts), (ii)
something falls into the predicated
the general arguments described by Osherson and colleagues (1990):
perceivers observe that given subordinate categories (here, "slammed
door", "accused them", "argued") are described by a certain predicate
act

the

or

was

374
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(here,

"is what he

that the

did"), and conclude

with

more or

less confidence

superordinate category (here, "quarrelsome")

predicate ("is what he did").
Hypotheses 3 and 4 explore

the influence of the

has the

same

representativeness

of

observed subordinate act

superordinate

trait

categories on perceivers' confidence in using
categories to describe those acts. As multiple-stage

models of person perception are making increasingly clear, this is an
important and non-trivial step in person perception (Bassili, 1989; Gil
bert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986; Reeder &

Brewer, 1979; Trope, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1986). A given behavior often

by multiple traits (e.g., is "slammed the door when he
quarrelsome, careless, or exuberant?) or might best be
described without a trait term at all. Furthermore, identifying a behavior
with a trait term might have important consequences for later causal
attributions or predictions of the actor's behavior (as explored in Study
3). In this way, the problem we are investigating is similar to the early
(behavioral identification) stages in multiple-stage models of person
perception. However, one important difference is that our perceivers are
describing a set of acts, not individual acts. This will be discussed further
can

be described

left the room"

in the discussion.

Hypothesis

3

was

that the

more

prototypical

the observed acts, the

stronger the argument. That is, the more each of the observed acts are
representative of the trait category, the more confidence perceivers will

good general description of the acts. We are aware
challenge to this hypothesis, and in fact Borkenau (1990) has
provided evidence supporting it. Hypothesis 4 was that argument
strength will increase with dissimilarity among the observed acts. This
hypothesis is based on the hypothesis that representativeness is deter
mined by the similarity of the observed categories to the other categories
in the same superordinate category (Hypothesis 2). Holding prototypi
cality constant, the more dissimilar the observed acts are to each other,
the larger the total number of the other acts in the trait to which they will
be similar, and so the more representative they will be of the trait. Thus,
dissimilarity should increase representativeness for the trait and thereby
aptness of the trait as a description of the acts. We are aware of no direct
challenges to this hypothesis, but challenges to Hypothesis 2 stand as
indirect challenges to Hypothesis 4.
The fifth and final hypothesis concerns another kind of person percep
tion, in which trait-description of observed acts has consequences for
predictions of unobserved acts. Oftentimes perceivers judge the likeli
hood that a specific person has performed a specific act (e.g., Is it possible
that Tom picked a fight with a stranger?). We propose that the prototypihave that the trait is

of

no

direct

a
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cality of acts that the actor is observed to have performed will be relevant
to such judgments, and consider whether
prototypicality of the unob
served act will also be relevant. For example:
G.

Observed:

Slammed the door when he left the

room

is

what he did.

Conclusion:

Picked

a

fight

with

a

is what he did.

stranger

Such arguments are analogous to the "specific" arguments in the Osh
erson et al. (1990) model: the
predicate ("is what he did") is generalized
from

one

subordinate category

the door

("slammed

.

subordinate category ("picked a fight.
") at the
included in the same superordinate (quarrelsomeness).
.

.

.

.

.

")

same

to another

level and

Hypothesis 3 was that prototypicality of observed acts increases argu
strength, and we tested it also in these cases. Because the trait term
is not explicitly mentioned, however, Hypothesis 3 might not extend to
such cases. Hypothesis 5 was that the prototypicality of the conclusion
act would be irrelevant to the judged likelihood of that act. This hypothe
sis seems less intuitive, for at least two reasons. First, more prototypical
acts may be more or less frequent than less prototypical acts, and so
prototypicality of a conclusion act should influence its judged likelihood
(Read et al., 1990). The second challenge is based on the assertion that
prototypicality represents facility at achieving goals, as described above
(Barsalou, 1985; Borkenau, 1990). Thus, an actor who has performed a
moderately prototypical act has shown only a moderate facility at
achieving a goal, leaving it an open question whether the actor is capable
of performing highly prototypical acts. Thus, performing a moderately
prototypical act might increase the perceived likelihood of other moder
ately or low prototypical acts, but not increase the likelihood of high
prototypical acts. More generally, an observed act might increase the
judged likelihood of equal or less prototypical acts, but not the likelihood
of more prototypical acts, resulting in an interaction between observed
act prototypicality and conclusion act prototypicality (Buss & Craik,
ment

1983).
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

present research tested the five hypotheses summarized in Table 1.
In Study 1, subjects rated the prototypicality, extremity, and pairwise
similarity, of 200 acts. Study 1 addressed the first two hypotheses: (i)
whether an act's membership in a category is a continuous variable (i.e.,
does prototypicality organize act categories into trait categories?); and

The
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(ii) whether

an act's
prototypicality is determined by its extremity or by
similarity to other acts in the same trait. In Study 2, subjects

its average

used trait terms to describe actors' behaviors that varied in their proto
typicality and intra-description similarity, providing evidence relevant

Hypotheses 3 and 4. Specifically, does argument strength increase
prototypicality and/or with the dissimilarity of observed be
haviors? In Study 3, subjects indicated how likely an unobserved act was
to

with the

to occur

the basis of

on

an

observed act. Both the unobserved and

prototypicality. Thus, this study tested
Hypothesis 5, which is that an act's prototypicality is irrelevant to its
predicted likelihood (and extended the test of Hypothesis 3).
observed behaviors varied in

STUDY 1
METHOD
SIMILARITY RATINGS

Subjects. Twenty subjects completed the materials in 2, 1-hour, indi
as
partial course credit for an introductory-level psychol
course at a
ogy
large midwestern university. One subject's data were
unavailable because of computer problems.
vidual sessions

Materials and Procedure. Acts
Buss and Craik
someness,

through

an

someone

were

taken from four of the traits in the

lists (dominance, submissiveness, quarrel
(1983)
and agreeableness). Buss and Craik obtained these lists
act

act-nomination

procedure. Subjects were asked to think of
by a given trait, and to list five acts

who could be described

the person had performed. The nominated acts were narrowed down
to 100, which represented a range of prototypicalities for each trait. For

example, "He slammed the door when he left the room" is highly
prototypical of quarrelsomeness, whereas "He accused them of talking
about him behind his back" is moderately prototypical, and "He argued
about the presidential candidates" is not very prototypical of quarrel
someness. Although 100 acts per trait were available, getting similarity
ratings
for the

on

all 4950

subjects.

pairs

of acts would have been too great of

We therefore selected 50 acts from each trait,

a

burden

by taking

the first and every other act from Buss and Craik's list. Additionally, as
prototypicality ratings varied with gender of the target (Buss & Craik,

1983),

we

stayed

within

worded with males
Each

as

one

the

subject completed

of each act to

a

arbitrarily chosen gender, and

all acts

were

targets.

the materials for

one

random selection of 25 of the

trait, rating the

remaining 49 acts,

similarity
for

a

total
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of 625

pairwise similarity ratings. The selection of pairs, the order of the
presentation of the pairs, and of the order of the acts within a pair, were

randomly determined for each subject.
Similarity ratings were made on an IBM personal computer. After the
subject read the instructions, the computer presented two acts, in the
middle-upper part of the screen, and just below them a 9-point scale
(from "not at all similar" to "very similar"). After the subject indicated
how similar the two acts were by pressing a number from 1 to 9, the
computer presented the next pair of acts. After every 100 ratings, the
computer enforced

a

minimum 20-second pause.

subject's estimate of the average pairwise similarity (APS) of an act
to the other acts in the trait was computed as the mean across that subject's
Each

subjects differed
subjects used the high
end of the scale and others used the low end), each subject's ratings were
standardized, before performing analyses, to a mean of 0 and a standard
ratings
in the

of the 25

means

pairs

of their

deviation of 1

in which the act occurred. Because

similarity ratings (e.g.,

(the results

were

similar

some

on

the unstandardized data).

subject rating similarity of dominance behaviors and one
Additionally,
of
rating similarity quarrelsomeness behaviors had low item-total correla
tions (below .20), and were excluded from all analyses.
one

PROTOTYPICALITY AND EXTREMITY RATINGS

Subjects and Procedure. Seventy subjects at a large
sity completed the materials in classrooms at the

conclusion of class-

compensation for
extremity and prototypicality ratings
did not contaminate each other, subjects were randomly assigned to
rating task and to order by distribution of questionnaires.
time, in small groups, and
their time. In order to be

were

sure

offered five dollars

midwestern univer

as

that

Materials. The same 200 acts rated for similarity were used (50 acts for
each of 4 traits). The first page of the questionnaire described the study,
and the second page listed four examples for a trait not used in the study.
The 200 acts were listed on the following pages, 11 to 13 per page. Acts
from a trait were always listed together, and the trait name appeared on
the top of the page. In the prototypicality rating task, subjects rated on a
7-point scale how good an example the act is of the trait (following Rosch
& Mervis, 1975, and Buss & Craik, 1983), from a "poor example of T" to
a

"very good example of T" (with T referring
extremity rating task, subjects rated how

the

2. 50 acts
a

partner

x

25

was

partners/2

also counted

required comparisons

=

in half.

of that act's 25

the trait

being rated).

extreme the act

is, also

In
on

by 2 because each time an act was
comparisons, cutting the number of

625. The total is divided

as one

to
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TABLE 2. Inter-Rater Reliabilities of

Average

Pairwise

Prototypicality, Extremity,

and

Similarity Ratings
Dimension

Trait

Prototypicality

Extremity

N of Raters

34

36

Average Pairwise
Similarity
4

or

5 per trait

Dominance

.94

.92

.73

Submissiveness

.95

.94

.80

Quarrelsomeness

.96a

.94a

.75

Agreeableness

.88

.85

.86

Note. Table entries

ordering
aTwo
on

a

are

Cronbach's

Alphas computed with raters in the columns and behaviors in the
alpha describes the consistency across raters in the rank

Each trait had 50 behaviors, and the

rows.

of the 50 behaviors.

raters did not

complete

all of the

ratings for the

trait

of

quarrelsomeness, so

those

alphas

are

based

33 and 35 raters.

7-point scale, from "not at all extreme T" to "very extreme T". Within
rating task, four different random orders of traits and of acts within

each

traits

were

created.

RESULTS
INTER-RATER RELIABILITIES

Subjects demonstrated satisfactory agreement on each of the three rat
ings of acts. Table 2 shows the reliabilities for each of the traits for each
of the three ratings. All of the reliabilities (Cronbach's Alphas) were
above .84 for prototypicality and extremity ratings, with most in the
mid-90's. The APS reliabilities, although lower, were also quite good.
The inter-rater reliability of the prototypicality ratings suggests that it
was
meaningful to subjects to rate prototypicality, and that subjects
agreed in the task's meaning. Additional evidence concerning Hypothe
sis 1, that prototypicality is a continuous variable, was obtained by
examining the distributions of prototypicality ratings for unimodality.
No value in the original metric of the scales had an act frequency that
was lower than values on both sides of it, with one
exception (there were
11 quarrelsome acts with a prototypicality between 2 and 2.99, 10 with

prototypicality between 3 and 3.99, and 17 between 4 and 4.99). This
"gaps" in the distributions argues against the possibility that acts
either were or were not a good member of their trait category. We also
investigated distributions at the individual subject level. A gap was
defined as a value on the prototypicality scale that had a
frequency that
a

lack of
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Among Prototypicality, Extremity,

and

Average

Pairwise

Similarity (APS)
Correlated Rat ings

Prototypical lity
and Extrem ity

Prototypical! ty

Extremity

and APS

and APS

Dominance

.77**

.64**

.48**

Submissiveness

.91"

.77**

.73**

Quarrelsomeness

.77**

.59**

.30*

Agreeableness

.58**

.28

.63**

Trait

Note. Table entries

are

correlations between the two variables listed at the head of the column,

the 50 acts within the trait listed

*p<.05, **p<

was

on

across

the left.

.01.

one-half of the

at most

itself and of

at

least

one

frequency

of at least

one

value

higher

quarrelsomeness,
respectively, showed at least one such gap. Thus, about 58%
within-subject distributions were relatively unimodal as well.

siveness,

than

value lower than itself. For dominance, submis
and agreeableness, 13, 14, 16, and 14 subjects,

of the

DIMENSION INTERRELATIONS
Each act received

one

extremity, and one average
by averaging over the prototypicality,

prototypicality,

one

pairwise similarity (APS) score
extremity, and APS ratings, respectively, obtained from the raters. The
following analyses are based on these scores, with act as the unit of
50 per trait). Before examining the results in the
analysis (thus, n
present data, it bears mentioning that the present prototypicality ratings
correlated highly with the ratings Buss and Craik (1983) reported (Domi
=

.88; Quarrelsomeness: r (50)
.75; Submissiveness: r (50)
This
r (50)
.54).
provides converging evidence of
.59; Agreeableness:

nance: r
=

(50)

=

=

=

subjects.
ratings were highly intercorrelated. With the
correlated with
exception of agreeableness, prototypicality was highly
and
APS
because
extremity were also
both APS and extremity. However,
their
relative
to
importance in deter
highly correlated, it is hard decipher
Table 4 shows the results of multiple regressions
mining prototypicality.
from extremity and APS,
predicting prototypicality simultaneously
and APS to prototypical
of
thereby describing the relationships extremity
Both
other.
extremity and APS had unique
ity while controlling for each
was
relationships to prototypicality, although extremity's relationship
variance
of
the
73-85%
that
between
Note
also
often substantially stronger.
dimensions together.
in prototypicality (R2) was explained by these two
that
in
an
of
prototypicality was
exception,
Agreeableness was somewhat
a

high

level of

agreement

across

Table 3 shows that all three
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TABLE 4.

Average

Regressions Predicting Prototypicality
Similarity (APS)

from

Extremity

and

Pairwise

Prototypicality

for

Trait of

Extremity (J

Similarity

fj

Explained Variance
in Prototypicality

Dominance

.61**

.35**

.69**

Submissiveness

.75**

.22*

.85**

Quarrelsomeness

.65**

.40**

.73**

67**

Agreeableness

.35**

-.15

Note. This table shows the results of four separate multiple regressions, one for each trait, with each one
predicting the prototypicality of an act for a trait simultaneously from the act's extremity and its average

similarity

to other acts in the trait. The first two columns show standardized

column shows the percentage of variance
*p < .05; **p < .01

explained (R ).

There

were

50 acts

partial betas,
in

and the third

each trait.

predicted as strongly, and not at all by APS. Perhaps the anomalous
agreeableness were due to the relatively low amount of variance
the agreeableness prototypicality ratings, a fact also noted by Buss and

not

results for
in

check that these results

Craik. As

a

reliability

of the APS

lations

(with

ratings,

we

were

disattenuated bivariate

corre

error). For all four traits,
correlation remained stronger than the APSas

extremity-prototypicality
prototypicality correlation, although
tions

not due to the lower inter-rater

computed

inter-rater reliabilities

the

were

estimates of

the differences between the correla

smaller.

DISCUSSION
1 revealed rater

about the prototypicality, extremity,
similarity of behaviors, suggesting that mental
categories are shared. The first hypothesis was
supported, in that an act's degree of membership in a trait category can
be characterized as continuous. Secondly, the multiple regressions
showed that nearly all of the reliable variance in prototypicality ratings
was
explained by the two variables of extremity and APS, in three of four
traits, suggesting that degree of category membership of an act depends
on its extremity and on its
similarity to other acts in the same trait.
Contrary to the second hypothesis, extremity was always the predomi
nant predictor. On the other hand, APS did explain uniquely a sizeable
proportion of variance in prototypicality (note also that this was despite
the fact that similarity and prototypicality ratings shared almost no
method variance). Thus, these results replicated Borkenau (1990) and
Read and colleagues (1990); importantly they replicated also with direct
pairwise similarity ratings, which neither of the previous studies as
sessed. In sum, neither the extreme version of the extremity position nor
the extreme version of the similarity position is tenable.

Study

and average intra-trait
representations of trait

consensus
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STUDY 2

Study

1 showed that acts differ in their

categories,

in their

degree

and that

of

membership in trait
degree of mem
its average similarity

act's

prototypicality,
by its extremity and
to other acts in the trait. Study 2 turned to the effects such a category
structure has on person perception. Specifically, Study 2 investigated the
third hypothesis (whether the prototypicality of observed acts enhances
argument strength), and the fourth hypothesis (whether dissimilarity
among multiple observed acts enhances argument strength). Subjects
read descriptions of targets' acts and indicated the aptness of the trait
term as a general description. Hypothesis 3 was addressed by varying
the prototypicality of the observed acts, and Hypothesis 4 was addressed
by varying the intra-description similarity of the observed acts.

bership

is

or

largely

an

determined

METHOD

SUBJECTS

AND PROCEDURE

Thirty-eight subjects completed the experiment in small groups, as
partial credit toward an introductory-level psychology course. After
arriving at the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to condi
tion, read the written instructions, and completed the materials. After
finishing, subjects read written feedback.
MATERIALS AND DESIGN

sensitivity, we employed a choice methodology. Sub
jects read descriptions of two person's behavior, and chose which was a
better example of the trait. Each description consisted of three acts from
the same trait, performed by the same person. For example: Who is a
better example of Quarrelsomeness?
In the interest of

Description

1:

Frank tried

to

avoid

Another time, Frank

responsibility for an accident.
exaggerated his personal problems.

Also, Frank changed his mind several times about where he
wanted to eat.

Description

2:

Evan told his friend not to

buy

the

car.

Another time, Evan criticized someone for smoking.
Also, Evan chastised a friend for not putting his napkin in
his

lap.
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In order to consider whether the

prototypicality

of the observed acts

aptness of the trait term, the acts in one description were more
prototypical than in the other description. To minimize the influence of
increases

similarity of the acts within a description ("intra-description similarity",
IDS), IDS was equal in the two descriptions. In one item-type, IDS was
low in both descriptions, in a second item-type IDS was high in both
descriptions. Thus, two item-types contrasted high prototypical acts
against low prototypical acts.
The other hypothesis was that low IDS would increase argument
strength, and two more item-types were designed to test this hypothesis.
In these items, one description consisted of acts highly similar to each
other (high IDS), and the other description consisted of acts not similar
to each other (low IDS). To minimize the effects of prototypicality, in one
of these item-types, both descriptions had low prototypical acts, and in
the other item-type, both descriptions had high prototypical acts.
Thus, there were four types of items, and each item-type appeared
for each trait, for a total of 16 items (there were two additional
item-types that were not relevant to the present hypotheses and will not
once

be

described).

Act Selection. Acts and

prototypicality ratings were taken from the Buss
quarrelsome
ness, agreeableness, and gregariousness. As prototypicality ratings var
ied with gender of the target (Buss & Craik, 1983), we stayed within one
arbitrarily chosen gender, and all acts were worded with males as the
and Craik

(1983) list of acts for the four traits of aloofness,

targets. Of the

100 acts available for each trait, 24

choices, each with 2

were

needed to create

and 3 acts in each

descriptions
description. Given
the
available
acts
was
strained to meet
of
appeared twice,
pool
the demands imposed by the design, and we were forced to be somewhat
flexible in our description creation. (Study 1 provided ratings on only 50
acts, which would not have been enough to create the materials; recall
that there was high agreement between the prototypicality ratings we
observed and those Buss and Craik [1983] reported.)
Description Creation. Each description consisted of three acts. High
prototypical descriptions had average prototypicalities above the mean
prototypicality for the trait; low prototypical descriptions had average
prototypicalities below the mean prototypicality for the trait. In items
which contrasted prototypicality, the difference between the average
prototypicalities of the two descriptions was as large as possible. Given
the differences in means and variances, across traits, of prototypicality

4

that

no

act

3. Although this
simplicity of a 2 x 2

method

ANOVA

gains

the

sensitivity

of

a

choice

methodology,

it loses the

This is because each item (and thus each response)
referred to two cells of the 2x2 table, not just one, which is required for an ANOVA model.

design.
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ratings (Buss & Craik, 1983), these differences varied with the trait. For
agreeableness, the two differences in prototypicality ratings were 1.16
and 1.43; for aloofness, 1.28 and 1.78; for
gregariousness, 1.28 and 1.59;
and for quarrelsomeness, the differentials were 2.97 and 3.05. In items
holding prototypicality constant across descriptions, the difference be
tween the average prototypicalities of the two
descriptions was as small
as
In
seven
of
the
possible.
eight items, the prototypicality differential
was less than .13. In one of the
quarrelsomeness items, we were unable
to keep the differential below .85.
When intra-description similarity was high, the three acts were chosen
to be similar to each other; when intra-description similarity was low, the
acts

were

chosen

so

that acts

that

none

were

similar to each other. In order to

not similar to each other for

superficial reasons,
description shared a major word, the word was
changed to a synonym in one of the two acts (e.g., "alone" was changed to
"by himself"; "club" was changed to "team"), in 9 of the 144 acts.
In order to insure that it was clear to subjects that the same target
performed all three acts in a description, the first line of each description
listed an arbitrarily selected name and a couple of irrelevant pieces of
information (e.g., "Robert is 26, lives in a moderate climate, and reads
the newspaper."). The next line listed the first performed act. The second
act followed on the next line, preceded by the words, "Another time,".
The third act followed on the next line, preceded by the word, "Also,".
The target's name was repeated within each act.
For half of the subjects, printed below the two descriptions was the
question: "Who is more T?" (T was replaced with the trait label), and the
two names of the targets. However, we also added a judgment task that
was more focused on the descriptive function of trait terms, so as to avoid
possible causal inferences: The other half of the subjects answered "Who
is a better example of a T person?" Assignment to this variable ("judg
ment task") was randomly determined by questionnaire distribution.
We predicted no effects of judgment task.
Questionnaire Layout. For the three traits of Agreeableness, Aloofness,
and Gregariousness, the items were organized systematically: 1. proto
typicality held constant at a high level; 2. IDS held high; 3. IDS held low;
4. prototypicality held low. Within each contrast, the description with
higher prototypicality or higher intra-description similarity was always
guarantee

were

when two acts in the

same

4. As will be discussed later,
to each other and

performed by
referring
an

et

as

the

summary

same

attribution of

a

that

descriptions

actor,

are

subjects

treat these

judgments as equivalent
multiple acts,
impression-formation task,

of the actor's acts. That is, when

observed

as

part of

an

simply a convenient way to summarize the actor's acts, and is not
causal disposition (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Park

to the actor is

al., 1994).

we assume
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the first

description. In
quarrelsomeness items

order to make

that order

sure

in

was

not

a

factor,

random order, and within
reverse to the other items.

presented
descriptions was
Comparing the quarrelsomeness results with
were

each item, the order of

a

the averages of the results
from the other three traits showed that within-choice description order

did not appear to influence responses.

RESULTS

JUDGMENT

TASK

None of the results

involving judgment task was significant at p < 10. Thus,
subjects responded in the same way whether they
were choosing the actor that was a better example of the trait or choosing
the actor that was more of the trait. Therefore, in all further analyses, the
data were collapsed over judgment task.

we can

.

conclude that

EFFECT OF PROTOTYPICALITY

Hypothesis 3 was that descriptions with higher prototypicality would be
more
readily described with the trait term. Two item-types contrasted high
against low prototypical descriptions. As each item-type appeared four
times, a subject could choose the high prototypical description between 0
and 4 times. If prototypicality had no effect on subjects' choices, then the
high prototypical description would be chosen half of the times (2). Thus,
the average number of times the high prototypical description was chosen
was tested against 2,
using the t distribution. When IDS was low in both
the
descriptions,
high prototypical description was chosen an average of
3.2 times, which was significantly greater than 2, t (36)
8.62, p < .001.
when
both
had
alternatives
IDS,
Similarly,
high
high prototypical descrip
tions were chosen 2.8 times, also significantly greater than 2, t (36)
6.36,
< .001. In both cases, the more
the
observed
the
behaviors,
p
prototypical
more subjects thought that the trait was a
good description, supporting
Hypothesis 3. However, a within-subjects f-test revealed that the two
=

=

values differed from each other, t

prototypicality
not

was

stronger

2.32, p < .05. Thus, the effect of
(36)
when behaviors within a description were
=

similar to each other.

INTRA-DESCRIPTION SIMILARITY OF ACTS.

Hypothesis 4 was that descriptions with low IDS would be more readily
by the trait term than would descriptions with high IDS. Two
item-types contrasted low IDS against high IDS descriptions. The aver
age number of times the low IDS description was chosen was tested
described
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the t distribution. When

prototypicality was low in both
chosen as reflecting more of
the trait an average of 1.5 times, which was
significantly lower than 2, t
3.86, p < .001. When both descriptions were highly prototypical,
(36)
there was no effect of IDS (M
.42, ns. A within-subjects
2.1), t (36)
f-test verified that the effect of
intra-description similarity depended on
the prototypicality of the behaviors, t (36)
2.41, p < .05. Thus, Hypothe
sis 4 was not supported: dissimilarity among observed behaviors did not

descriptions,

the low IDS

description

was

=

=

=

=

increase

use

of the trait term, and in

one

case,

decreased it.

DISCUSSION
Four

independent analyses converged in supporting the hypothesis that
was influenced
by the structure of acts in trait cate
gories. Hypothesis 3 was supported: prototypicality of observed behav
iors enhanced the aptness of the trait term as a general description of the
acts. Hypothesis 4 was not supported: intra-description similarity did
argument strength

of the trait term (and in one case, the results were reverse
in direction). Additionally, prototypicality and intra-description similar
ity moderated each other, so that each provided less strength if the other

not

decrease

variable

Study 1)

use

was

high.

make

a

The failures of

strong

case

Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 2 (in
that, for perceivers, feature similarity of

primary dimension of behaviors.
Why did intra-description similarity unexpectedly enhance
trait terms? For example:

behaviors is not the

High Intra-description Similarity:
Steve pledged a fraternity
Another time, Steve joined the country
Also, Steve participated on a ski team.
Low

Intra-description Similarity:
James arrived late at the meeting
a

friend

en

use

of

club.

because he conversed with

route.

Another time, James went to

Also, James

the

was

a

bar.

argumentative

at

a

discussion.
kinds of

Hypothesis 4 was that, because James' three acts exhibited more
kind of gregarious
gregariousness than did Steve's three acts (only one
ness), James' behavior would be more representative of gregariousness
than Steve's behavior, and so James would be chosen as a better example
of gregariousness. This hypothesis was not supported, and in fact, the data
is that, rather than
were in the opposite direction. One possible explanation
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representing diverse aspects of the trait, each of the low similarity acts
remained ambiguous as to whether they represented the trait at all.
For example, is James' "arriving late at the meeting because he con
versed with a friend en route" gregarious or unreliable? When the acts
in
as

dissimilar to each other, such alternative traits remain salient
descriptions of the acts. In contrast, when the three acts in a set are

a

set

are

similar to each other, the trait-relevant aspects of each act become
highlighted. The "joining" aspect of Steve's acts is highlighted, and

joining

is

gregarious.

individual acts

are

That is, the set-as-a-whole is relevant to how
case of dissimilar low
prototypical

described. In the

ity behaviors, alternative descriptions remained salient and the acts
remained ambiguous, lowering perceivers' confidence in the trait term.
STUDY 3

Study 2 showed that the prototypicality of observed behaviors, and their
similarity to each other, influenced the use of trait terms to describe them.
Study 3 turns to another aspect of person perception, in which perceivers
observe one act that an actor has performed, and judge the likelihood of
the actor performing another, unobserved act. By varying the prototypi
cality of the observed behavior, we test Hypothesis 3 in this context as
well. Specifically, Hypothesis 3 predicts that prototypicality of the ob
served act will increase the likelihood of the unobserved act. However,
because the superordinate trait category is not explicitly mentioned in
these cases, the observed act's

prototypicality

for the trait may not be

relevant, predicting no effect of the observed act's prototypicality.
Hypothesis 5, that the prototypicality of the conclusion (unobserved)
would be irrelevant to the

act

strength of such arguments, is the main focus
of Study 3. There are at least two challenges to Hypothesis 5. First, there
may be baseline differences in act frequencies, and they may be correlated
with prototypicality. For example, if high prototypical acts are more
frequent than low prototypical acts [as Read et al.'s (1990) subjects be
lieved], then their judged likelihoods should be greater than for low
prototypical acts, which would be evident in a main effect of conclusion
act prototypicality. The second challenge to
Hypothesis 5 is based on
reasoning about the nature of prototypicality. Borkenau (1990) argued that
prototypicality might track extremity because extremity indicates how
capable an actor is of achieving certain goals, and this level of capability is
important to perceivers. This suggests that perceivers might be interested
in more than simply whether the actor has any capability at all, but also in
the degree of capability that the actor has. As the prototypicality of the
observed behavior indicates what the actor is at least
minimally capable
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of, observed

acts might increase the likelihood of equal or less prototypical
acts, but not affect the likelihood of more prototypical acts. This line of

reasoning would predict an interaction between
cality and conclusion-act prototypicality.

observed-act

prototypi

METHOD

SUBJECTS

AND PROCEDURE

Fifty-three subjects completed the experiment in small groups, as partial
an
introductory-level psychology course at a large midwestern university. After arriving at the experiment, subjects were ran
domly assigned to condition, read the written instructions, and
completed the materials. After finishing, subjects read written feedback.

credit towards

DESIGN AND MATERIALS

study used a rating format, and consisted of a fully factorial 2
(observed act prototypicalities) x 2 (conclusion act prototypicalities) x 2
(item-orders) design. The item-orders factor was between subjects, and

This

were within subjects. The observed act was either
prototypicality and the conclusion act was either high or
low in prototypicality. Crossing the within-subjects factors created 4
types of descriptions, each appearing 4 times, once for each trait.
Description Creation. Each description consisted of an observed act and
a conclusion (unobserved) act. Because this study required fewer total
acts than Study 2, the acts and prototypicality ratings were drawn from
Study 1 (50 acts in each of the four traits of agreeableness, dominance,
quarrelsomeness, and submissiveness). The acts in Study 1 were split at
the mean of the prototypicality ratings within each trait into high and
low prototypicality acts. Study 2 revealed the ambiguity inherent in
dissimilar acts; given this, all act pairs were similar to each other/ Thus,
all act-pairs were those that had higher than average similarity ratings
in Study 1. Both of the behaviors in a description came from the same

the other two factors

high

or

low in

trait.
It

was

important

been observed;

regard.

That is,

we

subjects

that the conclusion act had not

considered that future

tense would be effective in this

to be

subjects

be that the actor will
5

clear to

were

perform

instructed to

Study

dissimilar

acts

how

likely

are

it would

was

given

in Study 3. However, because the results
ambiguous, these are not described here.

Subjects also rated dissimilar act-pairs
2 indicated that

predict

the second action. Each item

a

of
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Low
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FIGURE 1. The effects of observed act

prototypicality

number and

Prototypicality

prototypicality

and conclusion (unobserved) act

the rated likelihood of the unobserved act.

on

an

arbitrary name,

and

presented as

in the

following

exam

ple:
a) Doug did

not

complain when someone used his car without permis

sion.

b) Doug will let
How

likely

a

casual

acquaintance

do you think it is that

borrow his record album.

Doug

will do the second action?

Subjects responded on a 7-point scale, from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very
likely). Each description-type appeared four times, once per trait. For
each subject, a score was created for each description-type by taking the
mean across the four times the
description-type occurred.
Format.
The
first
Questionnaire
page of the questionnaire instructed the
an
and
In
gave
example. the trait-order condition, the following
subjects
the
listed
descriptions by trait, with the name of the trait written
pages
at the beginning. The items for one trait
appeared in random order
within the trait

over

three pages, and the traits

were

ordered

as

follows:

submissiveness, dominance, quarrelsomeness, and agreeableness. In the
no-order condition, all items were randomly ordered, and appeared
three per page.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In

2 (observed act
prototypicality) x 2 (conclusion act prototypicality)
(item-order) ANOVA, only the main effect of observed act prototypi
cality was significant, F (1, 51) 52.87, p < .001. There was no effect for
conclusion act prototypicality, F (1, 51)
2.07, p > .15, no interaction
between conclusion act and observed act prototypicality, F (1, 51) < 1,
x

a

2

=

=

nor a

main effect of

trait-order led to

order, F (1, 51)

=

3.15, p

slightly higher ratings

<

in

(the trend suggests that
general). Furthermore, all

.10

interactions between order and other effects in the model

all F's

significant,
prototypical
prototypical
likelihood

ior, and

<

2.53, all p's

>

.10. As

can

be seen in

were

not

Figure 1, the highly

observed acts led to greater judged likelihood than the low
observed acts. Thus, at least for similar act pairs, judged

was

enhanced

unaffected

by

the

prototypicality

of the observed behav

the prototypicality of the conclusion behavior.

by
supported Hypothesis 3, demonstrating that prototypicality
also had consequences for conclusions about predictions of unobserved
acts. Hypothesis 5 was also supported: the prototypicality of conclusion
acts was not relevant to argument strength.
was

The results

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Starting with Buss and Craik's (1983) joining of family-resemblance and
summary-labels models of traits, and analogizing from research on
natural objects (Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975), we tested five hypothe
ses

about the internal structure of trait

categories

and the influence of

goals. First, we wished
perception.
to replicate findings that subjects agree on the degree of belongingness
of an act to a category, and to provide evidence about the determinants
of these ratings. Second, we wished to explore some of the effects that
relative belongingness has on conclusions perceivers draw from observ
ing actors' behaviors.
this structure

on

person

We had two

RELATIVE BELONGINGNESS AS A STRUCTURAL FEATURE OF
TRAIT

REPRESENTATIONS

assuming that there is a hierarchical
structure of personality descriptors (Buss & Craik, 1983; Eysenck, 1947;
et al., 1991; McCrae & John, 1992; Wiggins,
Hampson et al., 1986; John
of this structure are categories like "exlevels
the
upper
1979). At
at lower levels are categories of acts.
"conscientious";
and
traverted"
were
hierarchies
of
Two aspects
particularly relevant to this research
et al., 1986). First was asymmetrical class-inclusion, which is
(Hampson
We followed several theorists in
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that all subordinate

up conversations with
of the superordinate catego

categories (e.g., "striking

included within

least

strangers")
ries (e.g., "talkativeness"), but that the superordinates are not included
in the subordinates (e.g., "striking up conversations with strangers" is a
way of being "talkative", but being "talkative" is not a way of "striking
up conversations with strangers"). The second relevant aspect of hierar
chies was that categories that differ in level in the hierarchy differ in
breadth (abstractness, generality), that is, in the number of bottom-level
categories they include.
Buss and Craik (1983) extended this model by adding the notion of
prototypicality. That is, some subordinates are better examples of their
superordinates than are other subordinates. Buss and Craik (1983)
showed that subjects agree on how good of an example of a trait a given
act is, as did Borkenau (1990) and Hampson (1982). The results of Study
1 replicated this finding. Furthermore, almost 60% of the subjects
showed no obvious gaps in their ratings, suggesting relatively unimodal
distributions of act prototypicalities
The second hypothesis concerned the determinants of the prototypi
cality of an act. A direct analogy from natural-objects would suggest that
an act's similarity to other acts in the category would determine its
prototypicality. In contrast, the possible role of traits as information
about an individual's capability to achieve certain goals would suggest
that an act's extremity determines its prototypicality (Barsalou, 1985;
Borkenau, 1990). Borkenau (1990) found that extremity was a better
predictor of prototypicality than was central tendency, and Read et al.
(1990) reported that goal facilitation was a better predictor of prototypi
cality than was similarity to the most prototypical acts (although Read
et al. were more concerned with goal-facilitation from the point-of-view
of the actor). In this paper, we compared extremity with similarity
obtained from direct pairwise ratings of acts. The results were consistent
with Borkenau (1990) and Read et al. in that extremity was the stronger
predictor. Nonetheless, similarity had a strong prediction of its own.
Why similarity and extremity both were associated with prototypical
ity is still unclear. First, other variables might be involved. For example,
perceived covariation among acts, either purely associationistic or ty
pological, might be related to both perceived similarity and to prototypi
cality (Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Sedikides & Anderson, 1994).
Second, we did not constrain perceivers' natural uses of "extremity" by
assuming a particular definition of extremity (e.g., as degree of goal
facilitation), but rather left it simple with the intent to capture the notion
of approximation to the end-point. Whereas this approach netted solid
results (e.g., high inter-rater reliability and strong correlations between
extremity, similarity, and prototypicality), it certainly left ambiguity in
are

at

one
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of

extremity to our subjects. Although extremity probably
approximation to an end-point, the end-point need not be ideal,
nor need it be ideal for
goal facilitation. For example, extremity could
track extremity of desire for a goal, but not the effectiveness of achieving
that goal (e.g., yelling at a superior might be an extreme behavior because
of its expression of a strong desire to be dominant, but actually be very
ineffective at achieving dominance). Alternatively, extremity might be
unrelated to motivational variables, and instead summarize properties
of the behavior itself, such as its effect size (Kelley, 1971) (e.g., extremely
dominant acts make others very unhappy), or even the vigor with which
it is enacted (e.g., commanding is more vigorous than requesting).
Further research is needed to (a) clarify the meaning of extremity, (b)
explain the relationship between extremity and average pairwise simi
larity, and (c) untangle why prototypicality is related to both extremity
and average pairwise similarity.
One challenge to this research enterprise questions our assumption
that traits are organized hierarchically. Gross, Fischer, and Miller (1989)
argued that adjectives (possibly including traits) do not have a hierar
means

chical structure, but rather

"dumbbell"

a

shape.

For

example,

all traits

multi-dimensional space, with each dimension
organized
one word to
express each pole (e.g., "extraverted" and "intro
having
into

are

verted").
are

a

All other trait words
in

arranged

"talkative" is not

(spherical)
a

are

simply variants of these words, which
poles. For example

clouds around such

subordinate of "extraverted", but rather is a variant
argument for this claim is that it does not

of "extraverted". A central
make
et
a

sense

say that an adjective "is a kind of" another adjective (Gross
For example, it does not make sense to say that "talkative is

to

al., 1989).

kind of extraverted". As such class-inclusion relations

meaning

of hierarchies,

one

cannot

use

are

hierarchy-based

central to the

models to

un

Miller and Fellbaum (1991) allowed for
al.
et
(1986) argued that adjectives are describable with
verbs, Hampson
class-inclusion
statements, specifically, with "is a way
modified

derstand traits. However,

slightly
of being".
et al.

In

(1986)

as

series of experiments (see also John et al., 1991), Hampson
showed that such class-inclusion statements deliver the

a

For example, subjects agree that "to
necessary judgment asymmetries.
of
be talkative is a way
being extraverted", but do not agree that "to be
of
extraverted is a way
being talkative", suggesting that talkative is a
extraverted.
of
Thus, there is at least some evidence
subordinate

category

to

support

the

assumption

that traits

are

organized hierarchically.

modified version of the Gross et al. (1989)
Aside from this debate,
with our results. Assuming that acts are
consistent
model might be
multi-dimensional
in this
space, that similarity is determined
a

organized

by distance

in the space, and that

prototypicality equals closeness

to

the
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spherical distribution of acts,
extremity
prototypicality (acts beyond
the pole would have high extremity but low prototypicality). However,
it is possible that the distribution of acts around the poles looks more like
an
hourglass than a dumbbell. That is, few acts are more extreme than
the poles, and acts closer to the middle of the dimensions are relatively
closer to the dimensions. Such a model might explain all three inter-cor
relations among prototypicality, extremity, and similarity. Future re

poles,

our

results

are

not consistent with

a

would be unrelated to

for then

search is needed to address this issue.

EFFECTS OF RELATIVE BELONGINGNESS ON
PERSON PERCEPTION

investigated two kinds of person perception. Our
(1) trait categories are represented mentally as a
assumptions
&
1983; Eysenck, 1947; Hampson et al., 1986; John
Craik,
hierarchy (Buss
et al., 1991; McCrae & John, 1992; Wiggins, 1979); (2) trait terms are often
applied to people as summary descriptions of their behavior rather than
as
enduring causal explanations of behavior (Alston, 1975; Buss & Craik,
1983; Hampshire, 1953; John, 1990; Newman & Uleman, 1993); and (3)
perceivers apply such summary trait labels with more or less confidence,
but rarely with certitude (Park, 1989; Park et al., 1994). Our general
proposal was that the hierarchical trait structure would influence per
In this

research,

we

were

that

ceivers' conclusions about actors' behaviors.

The first kind of person

perception

we

examined

was

the conclusion

good summary label of an actor's observed behavior. We
conceived of such conclusions as the use of a higher-level category in the
that

a

trait is

a

hierarchy to describe what an actor did. Results supported Hy
pothesis 3, in that the more prototypical (representative) the observed
acts were of their superordinate trait, the more confidence perceivers had
in using the trait to summarize the acts. Hypothesis 4 was not supported,
in that dissimilarity among the observed behaviors did not increase this
confidence. Together with the limited support for Hypothesis 2, it is
probable that representativeness of an act (or of an act set) for a trait is
not determined primarily by similarity.
Person-perception is increasingly being described by (at least) twostage models (Bassili, 1989; Gilbert et al., 1988; Higgins et al., 1986;
Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Trope, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1986). In the first
stage, perceivers describe an observed act with a trait term, and in the
second stage, perceivers attribute a causal disposition to the actor. This
trait

distinction between the two stages is close to the distinction between
using a trait term to refer to an act (Stage 1) and using the trait term to

refer to

an

actor

(Stage 2), as can be seen most clearly

in the

case

of

single
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example, it is easy to imagine thinking that a given
thinking that the actor is generally rude. This distinc

tion is

important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, situational
information has been shown to have very different effects on attributions
of causality than on descriptions of acts. On the other hand, it is

rarely
good description of an act, but
such descriptions can have consequences for further
interpretations or
about
the
actor
in
The
predictions
(as explored
Study 3).
goal of Study 2
was to contribute to the
of
such
behavioral
understanding
descriptions.
However, when perceivers use a single trait term to describe a set of
multiple observed acts, referring to the actor may not be part of the
second stage (i.e., may not involve an attribution of a causal disposition).
Rather, referring to the actor with the trait term may simply be an
efficient way to represent the description of multiple acts (e.g., Hastie &

obvious which trait term

(if any at all)

Kumar, 1979; Park, 1986; Park
of

summary-labels

describes

a

set of

tion to the actor

pointed

et

a

al., 1994). In fact, this is the central claim

models of traits:

saying

an

actor

the actor's acts and does not attribute

(e.g.,

Buss &

this out when

has
a

a

trait

causal

only
disposi

Craik, 1983). Newman and Uleman (1993)

arguing

that "trait-related terms

least five ways: (a) to describe
at

is

time, (c)

a

be used in at

can

particular behavior, (b)

to describe behaviors that

to

describe

a

person does

particular
frequently, (d) to describe a person over time, and (e) to describe a
dispositional cause." (p. 515). The (c) and (d) senses refer to the actor, but
only as a way of describing the actor's acts, not as a causal disposition
(e). Future research is needed to clarify (1) where summary-labels uses
of trait terms fit into multiple-stage models, (2) the extent to which
descriptions of sets of behaviors refer to actors, and (3) the effects of
trait-category mental representations on the other three uses of trait
terms. The focus of our work was rather on demonstrating the effects of
prototypicality of observed acts on the use of trait terms as descriptive

person

a

a

summary labels.
Hypothesis 5 concerned another aspect of person-perception. In these
cases,
judge the likelihood that an actor performed an act on

perceivers
observing

the basis of

other actions of the actor. The results extended the

Hypothesis 3 to such cases, and also supported Hy
Specifically, the surprising result Rips (1975) reported was
pothesis
extended to person perception: prototypicality of a conclusion act was
not relevant to its judged likelihood. We find the lack of an interaction
between observed-act and conclusion-act prototypicality particularly
surprising. This result means that perceivers did not distinguish be
tween people in which acts of a trait were expected of them, only in
whether acts in a trait were expected of them. Some researchers have
argued that one purpose of trait categories is to keep track of who is
confirmation of
5.
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capable of achieving certain socially-valued goals, and that more proto
typical acts are better for achieving those goals. Thus, we might expect
that perceivers would distinguish people who are best able to achieve
the goals (perform highly prototypical acts) from those who are also
capable, but only moderately so (perform moderately or low prototypi
cal acts). For example, a highly skilled runner is not expected to run more
often, but rather
appears that

frequency
effective

to

run

faster when

perceivers distinguish

or

likelihood of

running.

In the trait

between actors

only

domain, it

in their relative

skill-relevant acts, not in how
More generally, and independently of

performing

capable those acts are.
prototypicality represents skill, perceivers might be expected to
track the quality of the acts expected of actors. For example, highly
dominant people seem to perform dominant acts not only more often,
but also dominant acts that are more "intensely" dominant (e.g., McCrae
or

whether

& Costa, 1990, p. 23). However, the present results suggest that withintrait dimensional thinking about the expected behaviors of actors is

frequency, and does not include level of prototypicality of acts.
considering is the role of the predi
cate in person-perception arguments. Because we were interested in the
summary-labels usage of trait terms, we used "is what P did" as our
predicate. In addition, this was a "blank predicate" (i.e., subjects did not
know anything about the actors except their acts), so that we could focus
on the role of
categories in such arguments. However, if interest were in
individuals' reasoning about behaviors, a different predicate could be
used, as noted by one reviewer. For example, the predicate "is performed
by people who experienced quintic childhoods" would be useful in
understanding how subjects make inferences about associates of behav
iors. The Osherson and colleagues (1990) model would suggest interest
ing hypotheses about such inferences as well, and future research could
explore whether similar results to those found in the present research
limited to

One final and related issue worth

obtain.
In sum,

part of the interest

in mental

representations

of traits arises in

their

implications both for the "how" and for the "what" of person-per
ception (Trope & Higgins, 1993). The data indicated that person percep
tion processes draw

on

stored, structured knowledge about traits. In

contrast to characterizations of

perceivers

as

rather broad-banded cate-

who pay attention only to the mere membership of a behavior
trait or another, this research showed that perceivers can be

gorizers,
in

one

relatively sophisticated in the fine distinctions they make between be
haviors. From a perceiver's point of view, behaviors carry information
about their degree of membership in a category, their degree of extrem
ity, and their similarity to other members of the trait, and this informa
tion has consequences for the conclusions

perceivers

draw. A full
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performed

any
on
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person-perception calculus would

include the

operations

this information.
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